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Background and Aims: Survey-based studies often fail to take into account the predictive value of a test, in other 
words, the probability of a person having (or not having) the disease when scoring positive (or negative) on the 
given screening test. Methods: We re-visited the theory and basic calculations of diagnostic accuracy. Results: In 
general, the lower the prevalence the worse the predictive value is. When the disorder is relatively rare, a positive 
test finding is typically not useful in confirming its presence given the high proportion of false positive cases. For 
example, using the Compulsive Buying Scale (Faber & O’Guinn, 1992) three in four people classified as having 
compulsive buying disorder will in fact not have the disorder. Conclusions: Screening tests are limited to serve as 
an early detection “gate” and only clinical (interview-based) studies are suitable to claim that a certain behaviour is 
truly “pathological”. 
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INTRODUCTION
We welcome the initiative of Billieux, Schimmenti, Kha-
zaal, Maurage and Heeren (2015) in which they question 
the clinical validity of certain behaviours that are consid-
ered addictions. Hereby, we would like to contribute to 
this discussion by pointing out an important although often 
ignored statistical phenomenon closely related to the over-
pathologising of everyday behaviours: the predictive value 
of screening tests. 
Similar to the one carried out by Targhetta, Nalpas and 
Perney (2013) many studies struggle with the issue of 
separating “asymptomatic” and “symptomatic” (addicted 
or disordered) individuals performing a given behaviour. 
Although inventories are generally developed to provide 
a close estimate to a clinical test based on self-report, a 
screening instrument will never have diagnostic validity. 
But how precise can a screening instrument be compared to 
a clinical diagnosis? 
SPECIFICITY, SENSITIVITY, POSITIVE AND 
NEGATIVE PREDICTIVE VALUE
Diagnostic accuracy, originally developed for the evalua-
tion of laboratory screening instruments, is an indicator of 
the utility of a test (Glaros & Kline, 1988). It is measured 
by its agreement with a reference or “gold” standard that is 
the best available indicator of the presence or absence of the 
condition (Bossuyt et al., 2003). Accuracy is based on four 
concepts (see Table 1). Sensitivity and specificity provide 
information about the ability of the test to detect diseased 
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and non-diseased persons correctly. For example, if sensi-
tivity equals 80, it means that out of 100 diseased cases, 
the test will identify 80 as diseased. A specificity of 80, on 
the other hand, would mean that out of 100 non-diseased 
cases the test will identify 80 as negative and 20 as positive 
(diseased). Sensitivity and specificity are “fixed values” of 
the test (Streiner, 2003), which means that as long as the 
test is used in similar samples, these attributes remain the 
same. Positive and negative predictive value, on the other 
hand, provide information about the probability of a person 
having (or not having) the disease when scoring positive (or 
negative) on the screening test. A positive predictive value 
(PPV) of 80 means that out of 100 individuals scoring posi-
tive on the test, 80 are truly diseased, and 20 are not. A nega-
tive predictive value (NPV) of 80 would mean that 80 of 
100 will be correctly classified as non-diseased, but 20 dis-
eased individuals will score negative on the screening test. 
PPV and NPV are not “fixed values” but dependent on the 
prevalence of the disease in the sample where the screening 
test is administered (Streiner, 2003). 
Ideally, the number of true positive (truly diseased cases 
scoring positive on the screening test) and true negative cas-
es (non-diseased cases scoring negative on the test) are both 
high and the number of false positive (cases that score posi-
tive although truly non-diseased) and false negative cases 
(who score negative although truly diseased) are both kept 
to minimum. This yields the best accuracy of the screening 
test. When the prevalence is kept constant, then sensitivity, 
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specificity, PPV and NPV values are interdependent. In gen-
eral, the lower the cut-off value on a given instrument, the 
higher the number of true positive cases, and the higher the 
number of false positive cases as well. This leads to higher 
sensitivity but lower specificity and PPV. Another general 
tendency is that when the prevalence is high then the pro-
portion of false negatives may also be high, and when the 
Table 1. Calculation of accuracy
Diseased Non-diseased
Screened + True positive (TP) False positive (FP) All positive (AP)
Screened – False negative (FN) True negative (TN) All negative (AN)
All diseased (AD) All non-diseased (AnD)
Note: Sensitivity = TP/AD, Specificity = TN/AnD, Positive Predictive Value = TP/AP, Negative 
Predictive Value = TN/AN, Accuracy (or Efficiency) = (TP + TN)/total
prevalence of the disease is low then the proportion of false 
positives tends to be high (Streiner, 2003), which is gener-
ally the case with behavioural addictions. Thus, in order to 
calculate the probability of the disease given a positive test 
result one has to consider the a priori (antecedent) probabil-
ity which is the prevalence rate (for the Bayesian approach 
of the calculations see: Meehl & Rosen, 1955). 
EXAMPLES
The question arises: given a positive test, what is the prob-
ability that the individual truly has the given disorder? A 
few examples are shown in Figure 1. Note that as the preva-
lence drops, so does the PPV (whereas the proportion of 
false positives increases).
As it appears in Figure 1, even when specificity and sen-
sitivity are both at 99%, given a prevalence of 1%, the indi-
vidual has a 50% chance of not having the disease when the 
screening is positive. But screening instruments usually have 
much lower sensitivity and specificity values than 99%. 
One of the most widely used tests to measure compulsive 
buying behaviour is the Compulsive Buying Scale (CBS) 
by Faber and O’Guinn (1992). Using a group of self-iden-
tified compulsive buyers as the criterion group, the authors 
reported a sensitivity of 89.8% and specificity of 85.3% for 
the CBS. According to a recent meta-analysis (Maraz, Grif-
fiths & Demetrovics, 2015) the pooled prevalence of com-
pulsive buying is 4.9%. This means that out of those scor-
ing negative, 99% are probably non-diseased, but of those 
that score positive for compulsive buying, only 24% would 
probably be truly diseased. Although the test is unlikely to 
miss a pathological case, three in four people classified as 
Figure 1. Positive Predictive Value of actual and hypothetical instruments depending on prevalence
Notes: Sens = sensitivity, Spec = specificity. Positive Predictive Value = the probability of a person having the disease when scoring 
positive on the screening test.
Commentary
Journal of Behavioral Addictions 4(3), pp. 151–154 (2015) I 153
having compulsive buying disorder will in fact not have the 
disorder. 
Other instruments have an even lower predictive value. 
For example, one of the few clinically validated Internet 
addiction measures is the Scale for the Assessment of In-
ternet (and Computer Game) Addiction by Müller, Beutel 
and Wölfling (2014). This instrument was validated on a 
sample of 221 treatment seeking, clinically diagnosed prob-
lematic Internet users for which the authors reported a test 
sensitivity of 80.5% and a specificity of 82.4%. Using the 
same instrument, the authors conducted a population-based 
survey and reported a prevalence rate of 2.1% for Internet 
addiction (Müller, Glaesmer, Brähler, Woelfling & Beutel, 
2014). Based on this prevalence rate, NPV is nearly perfect 
(99%), however, PPV is only 8.9% (for the exact calcula-
tions see the Appendix). This means that out of those scor-
ing positive on the test, only 8.9% has the correct classifi-
cation. Thus out of a 100 individuals screened positive for 
Internet addiction, only 9 will truly have the disease, and 91 
will be misclassified. 
FURTHER CHALLENGES
A critical point in the test accuracy is the criteria or “gold 
standard” that the inventory is assessed against. Technically, 
if the individual scores positive on the compulsive buying 
scale, then he or she has 24% chance of being a self-identi-
fied compulsive buyer, because this was the “gold standard” 
against which specificity and sensitivity were tested. Thus 
it is paramount to test inventories against clinical criteria to 
provide a sensible estimate of the extent of the given behav-
ioural addiction. 
Establishing an “external criteria” for addiction is anoth-
er challenge. Unlike substance-related disorders, complete 
abstinence is often impossible and indicators of pathology 
are difficult to define. This is especially the case with the 
“innovative yet absurd addictive disorders” – as Billieux et 
al. (2015) state – such as tango addiction (Targhetta et al., 
2013), tanning addiction (Kourosh, Harrington & Adinoff, 
2010), study addiction (Atroszko, Andreassen, Griffiths & 
Pallesen, 2015) or “research addiction” from Billieux et al. 
(2015). From a statistical point of view, an instrument that 
has not been tested against a clinically valid (diagnosed) 
group is unsuitable to assess the disorder. 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE 
RECOMMENDATIONS
The accuracy model was initially developed for medical 
purposes where (1) there is usually a clear criteria of what 
constitutes problematic and (2) the cost of misclassification 
is relatively low. Classifying 100 individuals as “positive” 
and referring them to further tests is more reasonable than 
missing one person who might suffer from serious conse-
quences if the early signs of the disease are missed. But is 
the same logic true for behavioural “addicts”? Even if the 
cost of missing a case is the same, the cost of misdiagnosing 
is certainly higher compared to medical conditions given 
the scaremongering of the media that often exaggerates the 
impact of high prevalence estimates by presenting certain 
behaviours – such as using the Internet – as inherently dan-
gerous. As a consequence, the moral panic may create un-
necessary conflicts in families.
Low PPVs contribute to overpathologising everyday be-
haviours because the proportion of truly diseased people is 
much lower than the proportion of those scoring positive 
on a screening test. When the disorder is relatively rare, a 
positive test finding is typically not useful in confirming its 
presence given the high proportion of false positive cases. 
When the prevalence is low, a test is best used to rule out a 
condition but not to rule it in (Streiner, 2003). 
At the same time the low predictive value of a test does 
not imply that behavioural addictions are non-existing or that 
they are not pathological. It only means that the use of sur-
veys and screening tests is limited to serve as an early detec-
tion “gate”. One must always keep in mind that only clinical 
(interview-based) studies are suitable to claim that a certain 
behaviour for a given individual is truly “pathological”.  
Funding sources: This work was supported by the Hungar-
ian Scientific Research Fund (grant numbers: K83884 and 
K111938). Zsolt Demetrovics acknowledges financial sup-
port of the János Bolyai Research Fellowship awarded by 
the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
Authors’ contribution: AM designed, AM and OK wrote the 
manuscript and DZ revised the text. Each author has read 
and agrees with the information contained in the current ar-
ticle. 
Conflict of interest: ZD is the Editor-in-Chief of the Journal 
of Behavioral Addictions and AM is Associate Editor of the 
Journal of Behavioral Addictions. OK has no conflict of in-
terest to report. 
REFERENCES
Atroszko, P. A., Andreassen, C. S., Griffiths, M. D, & Pallesen, S. 
(2015). Study addiction - A new area of psychological study: 
Conceptualization, assessment, and preliminary empirical find-
ings. Journal of Behavioral Addictions, 4(2), 75–84.
Billieux, J., Schimmenti, A., Khazaal, Y., Maurage, P, & Heeren, 
A. (2015). Are we overpathologizing everyday life? A tenable 
blueprint for behavioral addiction research. Journal of Behav-
ioral Addictionss, 4, 119–123.
Bossuyt, P. M., Reitsma, J. B., Bruns, D. E, Gatsonis, C. A., Gla-
sziou, P. P., Irwig, L. M., Lijmer, J. G., Moher, D., Rennie, D. & 
de Vet, H. C. (2003). Towards complete and accurate reporting 
of studies of diagnostic accuracy: The STARD initiative. Clini-
cal Chemistry and Laboratory Medicine, 41(1), 68–73. 
Faber, R. J, & O’Guinn, T. C. (1992). A clinical screener for com-
pulsive buying. Journal of Consumer Research, 19, 459–469. 
Glaros, A. G. & Kline, R. B. (1988). Understanding the accuracy 
of tests with cutting scores: The sensitivity, specificity, and 
predictive value model. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 44(6), 
1013–1023. 
Kourosh, A. S., Harrington, C. R. & Adinoff, B. (2010). Tanning 
as a behavioral addiction. The American Journal of Drug and 
Alcohol Abuse, 36(5), 284–290. 
154 I Journal of Behavioral Addictions 4(3), pp. 151–154 (2015)
APPENDIX
The calculation of positive and negative predictive value on the example of the Scale for the Assessment of Internet and 
Computer game Addiction. 
Maraz, A., Griffiths, M. D. & Demetrovics, Z. (2015). The 
prevalence of compulsive buying: A systematic review and 
metaanalysis. Manuscript submitted for publication. 
Meehl, P. E. & Rosen, A. (1955). Antecedent probability and the 
efficiency of psychometric signs, patterns, or cutting scores. 
Psychological Bulletin, 52(3), 194. 
Müller, K. W., Beutel, M. E. & Wölfling, K. (2014). A contribution 
to the clinical characterization of Internet Addiction in a 
sample of treatment seekers: Validity of assessment, severity 
of psychopathology and type of co-morbidity. Comprehensive 
Psychiatry, 55(4), 770–777. 
Müller, K. W., Glaesmer, H., Brähler, E., Woelfling, K. & Beutel, 
M. E. (2014). Prevalence of Internet addiction in the general 
population: Results from a German population-based survey. 
Behaviour & Information Technology, 33(7), 757–766.
Streiner, D. L. (2003). Diagnosing tests: Using and misusing diag-
nostic and screening tests. Journal of Personality Assessment, 
81(3), 209–219. 
Targhetta, R., Nalpas, B. & Perney, P. (2013). Argentine tango: An-
other behavioral addiction? Journal of Behavioral Addictions, 
2(3), 179–186. 
Maraz et al.
